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   There have been many studies of conflict in the postwar period, but negotiation and 
mediation are relatively new subjects. Although accounts of negotiation can be said to go 
back to the Scriptures (Genesis 18: 20-33) to classical times (Thucidydes), the analysis of 
political negotiations begins in the 1960s with the works of Schelling (1960) and Ikle (1964), 
borrowing from economic and political studies, and branching out from there into the fields of 
social psychology, management studies, and related disciplines. Although nearly all the cases 
examined in these studies occurred during the Cold War, the theoretical observations hold for 
negotiation and mediation in international politics in general and their validity is not limited 
to a particular period. 
   The development of the concepts and analysis of negotiation over the recent decades has 
brought to light a number of analytical controversies that are useful to the pursuit of better 
understanding of the process and of its improved conduct. Using the typology of elements of 
negotiation developed by the Project on International Negotiation of the International 
Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (Kremenyuk 1992) - structure, process, actors, 
strategies, outcomes - these controversies can be examined to prepare the further 
development of concepts and mechanisms of use for the practitioner of negotiation and 
mediation. 
   The structural or power question relates to conflict management vs conflict resolution. 
Does the more attainable agreement to manage a conflict, that is, to reduce the means of 
pursuing it, also lower the pressures and hence the possibilities for resolving it, or, more 
directly, must it take more war to get more peace? The outcomes question refers to 
distributive vs integrative negotiations or, more familiarly, zero-sum vs positive-sum outcomes 
or win-lose vs win-win solutions: How can negotiations be moved from a situation and 
perception of outcomes where my gain is your loss to one where we both gain? The strategic 
question focuses on the concession/ convergence vs formula/ detail process. How can 
negotiations be moved from a process viewed and practiced as giving in bit by bit to the other 
party inching toward you and toward a process characterized by an overarching agreement on 
the nature of the problem and its solution, following by the hammering out of implementing 
details? The procedural question concerns the mechanisms by which different types of 
negotiation are carried out, depending on the number of parties. Most of the conceptualization 
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discussed so far concerns bilateral negotiation; is the same process applicable to multilateral 
negotiations involving large numbers of parties? Finally, the parties question deals with 
negotiation vs mediation. Under what conditions can the parties solve or manage their own 
conflict, and when do they need some help, with what consequences? 
Management vs Resolution 
   Opportunities for negotiation or mediation of a conflict, and the degree of management or 
resolution obtained, depend on the readiness, or ripeness, of a conflict for resolution. Feelings 
for a ripe" moment lie at the fingertips of diplomats. "Ripeness of time is one of the absolute 
essences of diplomacy," wrote John Campbell (1976, 73). "You have to do the right thing at 
the right time." However, few diplomats have clearly identified that essence, leaving it to a 
sense of feel. Henry Kissinger did better, recognizing that "stalemate is the most propitious 
condition for settlement." (NYT, 12 Oct 74). Even then it takes a special kind of stalemate. 
The concept of a ripe moment centers on the existence of a mutually hurting stalemate, 
optimally associated with an impending or recently avoided catastrophe (Zartman 1989). The 
idea behind the concept is that the parties find themselves locked in a conflict and cannot 
escalate their way out, and that this deadlock is painful to both of them (although not 
necessarily in equal degree). The catastrophe provides a deadline. Additional elements 
necessary for a ripe moment are valid spokesmen and a way out. Ripe moments are 
necessarily perceptual events, not ones that stand alone in objective reality; they can be 
created if outside parties can cultivate the perception of a painful present vs a preferable 
alternative, and therefore can be resisted so long as the party refuses or otherwise blocks out 
that perception. 
   They have, however, intriguing problems (Zartman 1992; Stedman 1991; Haass 1990; 
Kriesberg & Thorson 1991). One arises when increased pain increases resistance rathen than 
reducing it. Although this may be considered a "bad" or irrational reaction, it is common and 
may even be the natural and functional response to opposition: "don't give up without a fight," 
and "if at first you don't succeed, try, try again." Although the model implies efforts to break 
out before giving in, nothing indicates when and how the switch from breaking-out 
perceptions to giving-in perceptions will occur. In addition, pressure on a party in conflict 
often leads to the psychological reaction of worsening the image of the opponent, a natural 
tendency which is often decried as lessening chances of reconciliation but which has the 
functional feature of justifying resistance (Pruitt & Rubin 1986). Thus, the conditions which 
are designed to produce ripe moments naturally tend to produce its opposite. 
    The other problem is that the search for a mutual hurting stalemate encourages 
escalation, sunk costs, overcommitment, and other negative aspects of conflict. Brinkmanship 
is the godfather of ripeness. Is the death of Romeo and Juliette necessary for the 
reconciliation of Capulets and Montagus? Must the horse be stolen before the barn door is 
locked? The positive equivalent of ripeness is much more rare, if only because, inescapably, 
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the name of the game is conflict. Even its name is unknown and it will have to be called a 
mutually enticing opportunity, until a catchier label is found. It exists, however. 
   In positive terms, a conflict is ripe for resolution when the parties perceive an 
opportunity in the ambient conditions to gain a favorable outcome. The emphasis is the 
reverse of the negative ripe moment, but it is not merely a restatement with a different accent. 
While the mutually hurting stalemate also requires the perception of a way out, in the 
mutually enticing opportunity, the way out makes the moment, rather than complementing it, 
and the inability of the parties to escalate their way out is merely the background condition. 
Rather than a hurting stalemate, parties at the time of the mutually enticing moment are likely 
to find themselves in an ongoing deadlock of no particular cost, a drag rather than a pain. 
Furthermore, the mutually enticing opportunity is usually associated with a third party's 
efforts to mediate the conflict, in which as additional aspect of the opportunity lies in the 
chance to improve relations with the mediator. The positive ripe moment, then, contains a 
double opportunity to lower the conflict and to raise relations with the mediator. 
   While research has made great strides in separating the idea of management from 
resolution, in identifying the components of a (negative) ripe moment, and in conceiving of a 
positive equivalent, these advances open further questions (as they are supposed to): How can 
conflict management be used to promote rather than delay conflict resolution? What are the 
components of a mutual enticing opportunity and how does it work? 
Distribution vs Integration 
   Distributive negotiations deal with "cutting the 1 pie," or allocating parts of a fixed and 
finite outcome, whereas integrative negotiations refer to englarging and sharing rather than 
just cutting the pie (Walton & McKersie 1968, :ax % Sebenius 1986). In reality, the types 
overlap. Even when it is possible only to cut a fixed pie, the pieces may in fact have different 
values to the different parties (a notion that is easier to sustain if we change the image to 
dividing up a fruit basket rather than cutting a more homogeneous pie). Hence the wisdom of 
Homans' Maxim (1961, p 62) that "the more items at stake can be divided into goods valued 
more by one party than they cost to the other and goods valued more by the other party than 
they cost to the first, the greater the chances of successful outcomes." Thus, integrative 
outcomes can be achieved by differential evaluation, even when the process is one of 
distribution. On the other hand, even when the pie is enlarged and shared, there is still likely 
to be some distributive element involved, since everything cannot be shared and the enlarged 
pie will doubtless have to be distributed in some way. 
   Conceptually, there are only a few ways of turning negotiations perceived as zero-sum or 
distributive into those perceived as positive-sum or integrative, although the conceptual 
categories can be translated into a myriad practical examples. Objectively, there are three 
ways of creating an integrative or positive-sum situation by expanding the common pie (or 
basket), by establishing trade-offs between differently valued articles, and by producing side-
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payments (out of items not in the pie or basket) (Pruitt 1994). While this sounds rather 
straightforward, there are many negotiations which have foundered because the parties 
focused only on their respective demands and did not consider giving something to the other 
party to get what they themselves wanted or bringing in additional items of interest to both of 
them in order to create a larger total out of which each might find something of value. 
   Subjectively, what is necessary is the admission that achieving one's demands does not 
require depriving the other, and that the other party has a legitimate existence and legitimate 
concerns, interests and demands itself (without of course any a priori granting of those 
demands). While this too sounds unobjectionable in the abstract, many international (and also 
domestic) negotiations are preceded by a fight over the legitimacy of one or more parties, and 
end with a refusal to "reward" the other side with any concessions or trade-offs. Reflecting on 
the Bosnian situation, the UN representative Cyrus Vance said, "If we refuse to talk on so-
called moral grounds to all parties to a conflict, how could we have ever solved any 
problem?" (NYT 19 Jan 93) 
   There are cases when trade-offs are not available or legitimate, however, when improper 
acts cannot be used by buy concessions, and when punishment and deprivation are the issue, 
just as there are bottom-line demands and vital interests in any situation that are beyond 
negotiation. The fact that such situations exist allows parties to claim them at any time and 
deny the creative potentialities of positive-sum negotiation. 
   Taken to the extreme, these misappropriations of the positive aspects of negotiations lead 
to Nicolson's Dilemma (1939), one of the most important problems in the negotiation 
literature: What happens when a Shopkeeper meets a Warrior? His answer was, "Don't 
negotiate!" Yet the answer is the sign of the dilemma, for in negotiating or in not negotiating, 
the Shopkeeper grants the Warrior a victory. In negotiation, the only deal is on the Warrior's 
terms, but in not negotiating, the Shopkeeper himself becomes a Warrior. Only lately has the 
question been addressed to find an answer in other terms (Ury 1992), whereby the Shopkeeper 
is able to bring the Warrior to negotiation, to an exchange of concessions, and to the creation 
of outcomes beneficial to both sides. The dilemma is resiliant and the answers are not 
definitive; more work is needed. 
Concessions vs Formulas 
   The typical image of negotiation, on which much & penetrating research and analysis has 
been based in economics (Young 1975) but also in sociology (Bartos 1978) and in philosophy 
(Barry 1986), is that of two parties starting at fixed and finite positions and inching toward 
each other to reach agreement somewhere in the middle. This is the image of bazaar 
bargaining with a rug merchant (Khoury 1968). It is also the apparent image of labor-
management collective bargaining, although in reality new items and larger issues may be 
added which go beyond the image and produce different bargaining processes (Douglas 1962). 
   The model gives rise to the basic paradox which underlies the dynamic of negotiation,
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known as the Toughness or the Negotiator's Dilemma: Whether to act tough and concede little 
or soft and concede alot, when toughness increases the chance of a favorable agreement but 
decreases the chance of any agreement at all, whereas softness increases the chance of 
agreement but decreases the chances that it will be favorable (Zartman & Berman 1981; Cross 
1969; Lax & Sebenius 1986). The Dilemma is crucial to understanding the indeterminacy of 
negottiation and the tactical challenges of practitioners as well, leading to Bartos' Paradox 
(1987) that toughness begets softness and softness begets toughness, quite the opposite of the 
image of meeting in the middle. In the end, the result can be seen to lead back to the Warrior 
and the Shopkeeper again. 
   There are several problems with this image of negotiation, besides the paradoxes and 
indeterminacy which provide little advice for practitioners and analysts on how people should 
and do behave in negotiations. One is that is fosters a negative public image of negotiations, 
of giving in to the other party. Negotiation then becomes necessarily a matter of winning, of 
holding to one's positions, and anything less is losing and weakness. The idea that 
negotiation is giving something to get something or that a meeting in the middle is a way of 
creating new goods to the benefit of both parties is lost in the image. 
   The other is that the image is usually inaccurate. Negotiations usually do not begin with 
fixed and finite positions and parties usually do not inch toward each other. When they do, it 
is only after they have established a general framework for their agreement and, within it, 
have left some details to be worked out. Negotiation typically passes through three phases -
that of diagnosis or pre-negotiations, in which the parties examine their positions and issues 
and prepare several conditions for their meeting; formulation, in which the parties look for a 
formula or common understanding of the problem and its solution, or a common sense of 
justice to govern the outcome, or a joint understanding of terms of trade; and then detailed 
agreement, in which the formula is translated into specific terms of agreement (Zartman 1978; 
Zartman & Berman 1981). Concession/convergence may indeed appear in this sequence but it 
tends to be in the final phase, after, explicitily or implicitly, a formula has already been 
established. Thus, the rug transaction is already governed by a tacit understanding that "rug 
for money" is all that is at stake, and most wage negotiations operate under the formula of 
"wages for productivity." On the other hand, "security for territory" as embodied in UNSC 
R242 was an effective, negotiated formula that served as a basis for the withdrawal 
agreements in the mid-1970s, the Washington Treaty of peace between Egypt and Israel in 
1979, the Oslo Agreement of 1993, and current talks between Syria and Israel. Many other 
diplomatic examples can be cited. 
   The formula image has many advantages for both practitioner and analyst, in addition to 
its accuracy. In developing public support, it permits a more positive, creative picture of the 
negotiating process. It thus allows and encourages parties, and their supporting audiences, to 
think of the process as one of creating a greater good that is not only beneficial to oneself but 
also has payoffs for the other party that engage its commitment to hold the final agreement in 
the future. (There is no purpose in making an agreement that does not contain incentives for 
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both parties to observe it). It provides a framework within which details can be placed and 
given coherence, so that they do not clash with each other or undermine the general structure 
of the agreement. The framework can also be used to help determine the outcome for details, 
without which each small item would become a battlefield and each small solution a isolated 
outcome. Furthermore, the three-phase division of the process helps practitioners and 
observers tailor expectations to likelihoods - parties should be expected to spend a long time 
in diagnosis and this is naturally a wary, even hostile, period; parties should then expect to 
look more cooperatively for common understandings of the problem and its solution;' parties 
should be expected to warily turn that formula into detailed agreements, being very much on 
the alert against attempts to gain advantage over the other, trying to win some final 
advantages for oneself, and in the process making sure that the formula translates itself into 
acceptable details. 
   But further questions still remain. How are optimizing formulas found, other than by the 
time honored practice of trial and error? Neat notions of Pareto optimal outcomes, Nash 
solution and Homans' Maxim have brought out precise criteria of maximizing behavior based 
on the concession/convergence image. Can similar notions be devised for the formula image, 
despite the fact that it is based on innovation and invention, not on a calculable negotiating 
front? 
Bilateral vs Multilateral 
   Most of our knowledge of concepts and L M mechanisms of negotiation concerns 
bilateral encounters, where the structure does much to determine the process. Bilateral 
negotiation is a joint decision-making process in which both parties have a veto, where an 
adversarial relation is inherent in the conflict of interests and a cooperative relation is a 
potential of the value of an agreement, and where issue positions can be indicated on one-
dimensional measures. Multilateral negotiations are very different (Zartman 1993). There is 
no apparent structure, and no clear indication of allies and adversary; indeed, most parties are 
both allies and adversaries, depending on the issue. The presence of many parties and many 
issues also means that there are many roles to be played. 
   On the other hand, multilateral negotiations are dominated by a mechanism not available 
to negotiations between only two parties, the need to form coalitions. While the dynamics of 
coalition might be expected to lead back to a two-party structure, this tends to be the worst of 
outcomes, creating either stalemate or veto or exclusion, depending on the size of the 
coalitions. More likely is the creation of multiple, shifting and unstable coalitions, occusioned 
by the multiple issues under consideration. But coalition is not a decision-making mode (in 
the absence of voting rules), but only the setting for subsequent negotiation. It is, however, a 
mechanism for reducing the complexity inherent in many parties dealing with many issue 
through many roles. 
   The nature of multilateral negotiation is managing complexity, a very different exercise 
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than either the convergence or the formulation processes of bilateral negotiation. The 
essential functions of this process are simplification, structuring and leadership -
simplification to reduce the overwhelming complexity that faces multilateral negotiators in 
order to render it manageable, structuring to give it a form by issues and parties in order to 
make it amenable to producing results, and leadership to provide direction in order to bring 
about a decision. There has been much research very recently in the mathematics of 
complexity that bears very little relevance to the practical challenges that face a multiulateral 
negotiator, but not much study of the multilateral process to show how these functions 
interact in order to produce a result. 
   If the study of bilateral negotiation is a recent subject of attention that has already 
produced significant results, the study of multilateral negotiation is in its infancy (Zartman 
1994; Hampson 1995) What is the relation among the various mechanisms for managing 
complexity? What are the strategies and limitations of simplification, structuring and 
leadership to be used to produce results? 
Negotiation vs Mediation 
   Mediation is best thought of as a form of negotiation, in which a third party is needed to 
help the parties do what they cannot do by themselves. Mediators' roles, derived from parties' 
needs, come in three forms. In order of involvement, they are mediation as communication, 
formulation, and manipulation (Touval & Zartman 1985, Zartman & Touval 1992). 
   The mediator as a communicator addresses the conflict as a breakdown in the ability of 
the parties to communicate with each other. Mediators may be needed to act simply as 
telephone wires, opening contacts and carrying messages. They may also be required to help 
the parties understand the meaning of messages through the dust of distortion thrown up by 
the conflict. They may be the object of communications when the parties cannot talk to each 
other, and even the receiver of concessions when the parties cannot give in to each other. 
This role is completely procedural, with no substantive contribution by the mediator, and in 
its lowest form completely passive, only carrying out the delivery of messages. 
   The second mode of mediation is more active, in that it requires the mediator to enter 
into the substance of the negotiation. When the conflict becomes so engrossing that it 
prevents the parties from conceiving of ways out of the dispute, they need a mediator as 
formulator. Mediators should be capable of the innovative thinking, and capable of working 
out ways of imaginative action that gets around the parties' constraining commitments. If the 
conflict prevents the parties from grasping the value of the mediator's suggestions at first 
hearing, the mediator needs also to be able to persuade. Persuasion involves power, and 
therefore requires greater involvement of the mediator than mere communication. 
   Yet this degree of involvement still may not be enough. The third mode requires the 
mediator to act as a manipulator, with the maximum degree of involvement that nearly makes 
it a party in the solution if not in the dispute. As a manipulator, the mediator uses its power to
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bring the parties to an agreement, pushing and pulling them away from conflict and into 
resolution. Not only must the mediator sell its vision of a solution but it must also take 
measures to make that solution more attractive, enhancing its value by adding benefits to its 
outcome and assorted in such a way as to overcome imbalances that may have prevented one 
party or another from subscribing to it. Not only must the mediator help improve the absolute 
attractiveness of resolution but it may even have to do so relatively by increasing the 
unattractiveness of continued conflict, an involvement that may mean shoring up one side or 
comdemning another and further straining the appearances of neutrality. This is the role of the 
"full participant
," as the American diplomatic position in the Middle East Peace Process in 
the 1970s and in the Namibian-Angolan negotiations in 1980s was described. 
   Formulation and manipulation pose the question of power, the ability to move a party in 
an intended direction, often referred to in mediation as leverage. A mediator has only four 
sources of leverage - the ability to portray an alternative future as more favorable than the 
continuing conflict (persuasion), the ability to produce an attractive position from the other 
sides, the availability of resources that the mediator can withhold from one side in the conflict 
or shift to the other, and the availability of resources that the mediator can add to the outcome 
(side payments). It is evident that in each case the effectiveness and a part of the source of the 
leverage lies with the parties themselves, a characteristic that makes the power mediator 
extremely limited. 
   It is of such paradoxes and complexities that the job of peacemaker is made. Like other 
paradoxes and dilemmas associated with negotiation, they raise questions for further study. 
Probably the most important concerns the sources of leverage (or power) of a mediator to 
bring the parties to agreement, as opposed to a particular agreement.
Conclusions
   The concepts and mechanisms identified in this review can be usefully applied to an 
analysis of cases, so that their dynamics can be better understood and their lessons more 
broadly presented. The questions raised can help us continue the expension and development 
of an important field of inquiry and activity. The passing of the Cold War has opened the 
world to numerous and murderous conflicts previously dampened by the global structure. The 
new era should also provide the opportunity for a deeper understanding and more widespread 
practice of conflict management and resolution through negotiation and mediation.
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